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Abstract
The unfolding of the 2007 world ¯nancial and economic crisis has highlighted
the vulnerability of real economic activity to strong °uctuations in asset prices.
Which is the optimal monetary policy in an economy like the Colombian that
is exposed to swings in asset prices? What is the implication in terms of Cen-
tral Bank losses when it follows a standard simple rule instead of the optimal
monetary policy? To answer these questions we use a Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium (DSGE) model with physical capital and sticky wages for the
Colombian economy and derive the optimal monetary policy. Then, we explore
the dynamic e®ects of news about a future technology improvement which turns
out ex post to be overoptimistic under the optimal policy rule and alternative
speci¯cations of simple rules and de¯nitions of output gap.
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During the last couple of decades, many monetary authorities around the world have
achieved the goal of a low and stable in°ation rate. However, this price stability has
not came hand-in-hand with higher asset price stability. Borio and Filardo (2003),
among others, document the emergence of asset prices, credit and investment booms
and bust which have become a more important source of macroeconomic instability in
both developed and developing countries. Financial unbalances are of great concern
because when they unwind, the real economy is exposed to a substantial economic
downturn and very frequently to recession. For example, many economist attribute at
least some part of the 1990 recession in the United States to the preceding decline in
commercial real estate prices (Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
The Colombian economy, like many other developing economies has experienced very
strong asset prices and output °uctuations. Figure 1 displays the cyclical component
of economic activity and asset prices for the Colombian economy during 1970-2005
1. Two boom-bust episodes are evident, the ¯rst during the eighties and the second
during the nineties. Since 2004 there was a boom phase that has been followed by an
economic downturn triggered by the 2007 global ¯nancial crisis. The close correlation
between asset prices cycles and output cycle and the evidence of a ¯nancial accelerator
mechanism in the Colombian economy that was found by L¶ opez, Prada and Rodriguez
(2008), rises the question if the nature of monetary policy is able to explain the behavior
of both variables. Would the boom-bust cycles be smoother if the monetary authority
incorporates a response to asset prices in the simple monetary policy rule? How costly,
in terms of central bank loss function, is a monetary policy that reacts only to in°ation
and output gap instead of taking into account asset prices?
To answer these questions, we set up a model for the Colombian economy where,
as in Cristiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2008), the boom phase is triggered by a
signal which leads agents to rationally expect an improvement in technology in the
future but the signal turns out to be false and the bust phase of the cycle begins when
people ¯nds this out. We explore the e®ects of these news about a future technology
improvement which turns out ex post to be overoptimistic under the optimal policy
rule and alternative speci¯cations of simple rules.
By optimal monetary policy we mean policy that minimizes an intertemporal loss
1asset prices correspond to a weighted average of equity prices and real state prices
1function under commitment. The intertemporal loss function is a discounted sum of
expected future period losses. We choose two alternative welfare criteria. The ¯rst is
a quadratic period loss function that corresponds to °exible in°ation targeting and is
the weighted sum of two terms: the squared in°ation gap between in°ation and the
in°ation target and the squared output gap between output and potential output. The
second measure of loss that we consider is a utility-based loss function.
Like in Svenssson et al. (2008) a key issue for a °exible in°ation targeting central
bank is which measure of output gap should try to stabilize. We report results from
three alternative concepts of gaps used in the loss functions and the simple policy rules.
One concept is deviations of output and asset prices from the hypothetical level that
would exist if the economy would have had °exible prices and wages. The second is
deviations from steady-state values. The third concept (used only in the simple rules)
corresponds to growth rates.
The model we use is a DSGE model for a small open economy like Colombia. The
model distinguishes households and entrepreneurs. Households consume and work,
while entrepreneurs produce an homogeneous intermediate good using capital bought
from capital producers and labor supplied by households. Entrepreneurs take bank
loans facing borrowing constraints, tied to the value of collateral. In addition, there
are banks who o®er two types of ¯nancial assets to agents: saving and loans; retailers
who set the ¯nal price of output goods; workers who supply their di®erentiated labor
services through a union which sets wages to maximize member's utility, generating a
nominal rigidity in wages µ a la Calvo. There is also a foreign sector which provides assets
at the foreign interest rate which is positively related to the net foreign asset position
of the domestic economy. Finally, there are capital producers who transform output
goods into capital goods, a government and a central bank which conducts monetary
policy.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 presents the optimal policy problem, the di®erent simple rules and the alternative
results of a boom-bust episode. Section 4 concludes.
22 The model
2.1 Households and Wage Setting
2.1.1 Consumption and saving decisions
The domestic economy is inhabited by a continuum of households indexed by i ² [0;1].


















t (i) per-capita consumption, h
pc
t (i) is per-capita hours worked l
pc
t (i) is per-
capita leisure time, which satis¯es l
pc
t (i) = l ¡ h
pc
t (i), with l > 0 being the total
endowment of time. Nt is total population which follows a stochastic process.




























with ¾ > 0, & > 0 y Á > 0. Parameter & is the inverse elasticity of labor supply with
respect to real wages. Parameter ¾ is the constant relative risk aversion coe±cient.
Preferences display habit formation in consumption governed by parameter Á. Â
u;h
t
are preferences shocks that shifts the consumption demand and leisure, At represents















t is a white noise variable.
Following Prada (2008) we assume that there exist transaction costs in the economy.
The exchange process requires real resources. In this process, the more transactions the









where vt (i) is deposits velocity and dh
t¡1 (i) deposits held by household i.
3Cost per unit of transaction is given by #(vt (i)), an increasing, positive, twice




with #0 > 0 y #1 > 1.
Households decisions have to match the following budget constraint
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where (at (i)) represents Arrow-Debreu assets with price pa
t (i), (dh
t (i)) deposits, (¿t)
lump-sum taxes, (wt) real wage, (trt) foreign transfers, (¦t) total pro¯ts from ¯rms and
banks ownership, (id
t¡1) interest on bank deposits and (¼c
t) CPI in°ation rate.
Households choose consumption and the composition of their portfolios by maxi-
mizing (1) subject to (4). Given that we are assuming the existence of Arrow-Debreu
assets, consumption is equalized across households and the ¯rst order conditions can
be expressed in terms of e®ective worker:
¸t
³






























along with (4), where ¸t is the budget constraint Lagrange multiplier.
2.1.2 Labor supply and wage setting
Following Erceg et al. (2000), we assume that a continuum of monopolistically com-
petitive households supply di®erentiated labor services to the production sector as an
imperfect substitute for the labor services of other households. There is a set of perfect
competitive labor service assemblers that combines household's labor hours in the same
proportions as ¯rms would choose. The aggregator's demand for each household's labor












The optimal composition of this labor service unit is obtained by minimizing its cost,
given the di®erent wages set by di®erent households. The demand for each di®erentiated
















is an aggregate wage index and µw > 0 is the elasticity
of substitution among labor varieties.
We assume that wage setting is subject to a nominal rigidity µ a la Calvo (1983).
The duration of each wage contract is randomly determined: in any given period, the
household is allowed to reset its wage contract with probability (1¡²w), the household
is not allowed to reset its wage contract. We assume there is an updating rule for all
those households that cannot re-optimize their wages. In particular, if a household






















where n 2 N is the indexation horizon, °k ¸ 0 is the weight assignned to in°ation rate
k per¶ ³ods earlier and 1 ¡
Pn
m=1 °qm ¸ 0 is teh weight assigned to the target in°ation
set by the monetary authority ¼. This adjustment rule implies that workers who do
not optimally reset their wages update them by using a geometric weighted average of
past CPI in°ation and the in°ation target set by the Central Bank, ¼.











u(ct+i (i);1 ¡ ht+i (i))
subject to the labor demand (8), the updating rule for the nominal wage (9) and the
budget constraint (4).
52.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs purchase capital in each period, (kt¡1
At¡1Nt¡1
AtNt ), and use it in combination
with hired labor, ht to produce the intermediate product, qs





























AtNt . The intermediate product is sold in a competitive market at
wholesale price p
qs
t . Following Christiano et al. (2008) we assume that technology, Â
qs
t ,
follows the exogenous process given by
ln(Â
qs







+ (1 ¡ ½
qs)ln(Â
qs) + ²t + et¡p
where ²t y et are uncorrelated over time and with each other. This simple process allows
to incorporate a boom-bust episode in the model. Throughout the analysis, we consider
the following impulse. Up until period 1, the economy is in steady state. In period
t = 1, a signal occurs which suggests ln(Â
qs
t ) will be high in period 1 + p. But, when
period 1 + p occurs, the expected rise in technology in fact does not happen.
Capital stock depreciates at the rate ± > 0. Following Gerali et al. (2008) we assume
that to ¯nance capital purchases entrepreneurs have access to loan contracts o®ered by
banks. The amount of resources that banks are willing to lend to entrepreneurs, z
f
t , is
constrained by the value of their collateral, which is given by their holdings of physical






















t is the `loan-to-value' and i
zf
t is the interest rate paid on loans, z
f
t . En-



































t represents the °ow of pro¯ts that will be transferred to households.
Given labor demand, the representative ¯rm purchase ks
t+1 units of capital at price
6pk





















































































2.3 Retailers and Price Setting
Retailers buy output from entrepreneurs and slightly di®erentiate it at no resource
cost. The di®erentiation of output gives the retailers some market power. Households
and ¯rms then purchase CES aggregates of these retail domestic good. Retailers are
introduced to motivate sticky prices and we follow Calvo (1983) in introducing price











































t is an exogenous technological factor, p
qd
t is the output price of the aggregate basket
qd
t and µq the price elasticity of demand for variety j. This parameter also de¯ne the
°exible price equilibrium markup charged by ¯rms.
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that only a fraction (1 ¡ ²q) of sellers are allowed
to reset their prices. In particular, if a ¯rm cannot set an optimal price, then it follows
a non-optimal price rule
p
qrule














where n 2 N is the indexation horizon, °k ¸ 0 is the weight assigned to in°ation rate
k periods earlier and 1 ¡
Pn
m=1 °qm ¸ 0 is the weight assigned to the target in°ation
7set by the monetary authority ¼.





































Capital producers purchase consumption goods as a material input, xt, and combine
it with the existing capital stock ((1 ¡ ±)kt¡1
At¡1Nt¡1
AtNt ), to produce new capital. We
assume that capital producers are subject to quadratic capital adjustment cost. The
price of capital is determined by a q-theory of investment.
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to







t is the marginal e±ciency of investment following Greenwood et al. (1988).
Capital producers' optimization problem, in real terms, consists of choosing the































The banking industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Since economic agents
require deposits and credit, banks produce the ¯nancial services through a production
technology that uses real resources from the economy as an input. Following Edwards







which is positive for z
f
t ; dt > 0, convex, continuously di®erentiable, increasing in all
arguments and homogeneous of degree one.
»t represents an inverse measure of the total productivity of the banking intermedi-
ation sector. It is a cost scale factor exclusive of the banking sector that follows that
process




+ ½» ln(»t¡1) + ²
»
t
where » is the expected value of the cost scale factor, ½» 2 [0;1) and ²» is white noise
variables with variance ¾2
».
The policy of the Central Bank and the banking sector is related trough the reserve
requirement which is a ¯xed proportion ¿d
t > 0 of total deposits, so the bank reserves,




Banks can borrow from the central bank at a nominal rate ibc
t . The net debt of a
private bank with the central bank is bt. The banks also ¯nance themselves through
foreign debt ft and they pay the interest rate i
f
t set in the foreign market. It is assumed
that the banks are the only private agents that have access to foreign resources.
The representative bank seeks the maximization of the discounted sum of pro¯ts
(¦b


































































































Bank¶s income is given by credit interest payments at a nominal rate i
zf
t¡1, foreign
9debt accumulation ft, deposits accumulation dt, accumulation of debt with the central
bank bt and the returned reserve from the central bank rbt¡1. These revenues are used
to pay for deposits at an interest rate id
t, to accumulate credit z
f
t , to pay foreign debt
at the interest rate i
f
t¡1, to pay the interest to the central bank icb
t , to accumulate new
reserves, to pay the real cost of the ¯nancial intermediation and to make pro¯t transfers
to households ¦b
t. 1 + ¼?
t represents foreign in°ation rate.





















where º > 1, ºz;ºd > 0.
Bank's optimization problem is a dynamic process. Banks maximize expected










¸t . The ¯rst-order conditions for domestic, foreign debt accumula-





































































































Following Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003) we assume that the foreign sector provides
resources to the economy at the interest rate i
f
t that depends on total net foreign
indebtedness, f ¡ abc




















where i? is the risk free foreign interest rate, Â
if
t is an foreign interest rate shock , acb
t
are foreign assets held by the central bank, FE is the steady state value of net foreign
assets and ­u > 0 is a scale parameter. We close the model in this way because without
it net foreign indebtedness may be non-stationary, complicating the analysis of local
dynamics. In steady state (ft¡abc
t )
yt = FE and 1 + if = (1 + i?)Âif.
2.7 Central Bank
Monetary authority is able to set the nominal interest rate prevailing in the interbank
market ibc
































where ½¼ and ½y are the weights assigned to in°ation and output stabilization, respec-
tively, ²i
t is an exogenous shock to monetary policy, and y
flex
t represents the hypothetical
output level that would exist if the economy would have had °exible prices and wages.







































t is the exogenous stock of foreign net assets and ¦bc
t are transfers to the
government.
2.8 Government
The government obtains resources from lump-sum taxes ¿t, net transfers from the cen-
tral bank, the transaction costs and capital adjustment and uses this to ¯nance public
expenses gt, that follows the process
ln(gt) = (1 ¡ ½g)ln(g) + ½g ln(gt¡1) + ²
g
t
11where g is the expected value of the government expenditure, ½g 2 (0;1) and ²g are
white noise with variance ¾2
g.
2.9 National accounts
Real GDP, yt, the ¯nal domestic income of the households

















































where trt represents foreign transfers.
2.10 Model Parametrization
The model is calibrated to match key steady-state ratios of Colombia. A period in the
model corresponds to one quarter.
2.10.1 Long-run parameters
Following Mahadeva and Parra (2008), the annualized foreign steady-state real interest
rate faced by the colombian economy is set at 3:42%. This implies a discount factor
of ¯ = 0:999. Following Prada (2008), the value of n is set to match the average
annual rate of growth of the total population in Colombia (this rate is 1:22%), and the
parameter a is calibrated to obtain an annual rate of growth of the labour-augmenting
productivity of 1:5%. A value of ¾ = 2 is used as the constant relative risk aversion
coe±cient, Arias (2000).
The steady-state foreign annual in°ation rate is set at 2% and the domestic annual
rate is set at 3%, the long-run target of the central bank in Colombia. The parameter
& is set at 3 to obtain a Frisch elasticity of 0:33, near the value found by Prada and
Rojas (2009).
12The model is calibrated to produce a steady state value of h = 0:294, the share of
time dedicated to the labour market. This implies a value of Âh = 146:90. We assume
that the banking costs are quadratic, and set º = 2. To match the average annualized
real lending rate (7:92%) and the average annualized real deposit rate (2:01%) reported
in Prada (2008), we set ºd = 6:284 £ 10¡5 and ºz = 1:324 £ 10¡4.
The level of real GDP the steady-state is normalized to unity. This is achieved by
setting Âqs = 0:524. The exogenous public expenditure parameter g is calibrated to
obtain a steady-state ratio of government expenditure to GDP of 0:178, equal to the
average of that ratio in the period 1994 : 1 ¡ 2007 : 4.
Following Mahadeva and Parra (2008) the value of total foreign net assets to GDP
is set to 1:20, and this implies a value of 1:20 for the parameter FE. The average
ratio of net foreign assets of the central bank to GDP (net foreign assets, monetary
sectorization - Banco de la Rep¶ ublica) is 0:454 in the period 2005 : 1 ¡ 2007 : 4, and
the parameter acb is set to match this ratio.
The average ratio of net foreign transfers to GDP is 0:0351 and the parameter tr is
set to this value. We assume quadratic transaction costs and set #1 = 2. The parameter
#0 is calibrated to match the value of the average ratio of deposits which generate costs
to the banks to GDP (1:20). This implies a value of #0 = 0:0126. The parameter
® = 0:456 is calibrated to get the average ratio of investment to GDP (0:215) reported
in Prada (2008). The steady-state leverage ratio mf is calibrated to match the average
ratio of credit to GDP (2:10). This implies mf = 0:33. Following Prada (2008), ¿d is
set at 0:062 and acb is set at 0:454.
2.10.2 Short run and additional parameters
Following Arango et al. (1998) the mark-up on production marginal cost is set at
25%, and this implies a value of µq = 5. The same mark-up is assumed for the wage
setting process. Following Bonaldi et al. (2009), the Calvo parameters that measure
the degree of price stickiness are selected in such a way that, on average, the ¯nal good
price is adjusted once each year (²q = 0:75) and the wage rate is adjusted once each
four months (²w = 0:25). The elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is
set at ½ = 0:84, as in Bonaldi et al. (2009).
In the baseline calibration it is assumed that there is no monopolistic competition
in the ¯nancial system, because this assumption is not needed to explain the spread
13between interest rates. Then µd ! 1 and µz ! 1. The habit persistence Á is set
at 0.5. The parameter of the adjustment cost of investment ªX is set at 0.7. The
persistence of the exogenous processes is 0.6. The parameters of the policy rule are
standard: ½i = 0:75, ½¼ = 1:25 and ½y = 0:50.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy and Simple Policy Rules
We ¯nd the Ramsey-optimal allocations for our economy using the computer code and
strategy used in Levin, Lopez-Salido (2004) and Levin, et al. (2005). The Central
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2 if obj = ss







if obj = flex
¡`util
t if obj = util
where flex represents the °exible price equilibrium variables and ss stands for steady
state values. The ¯rst two losses are often used as a metric for capturing policymaker's
preferences in studies that attempt to evaluate the trade-o® between in°ation variability
and output variability. In addition to these losses, we consider a second measure of loss,
i.e. a utility-based loss function, which we denote ¡`util
t . Following Woodford (2001),
we derive `util
t by taking a second order log-linearization of the utility function around
the steady state. We ignore the constant and ¯rst-order terms (the latter are zero in
unconditional expectation) and focus on the unconditional expectation of the second-
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14The terms that appear in the utility-based loss function, are directly related to the
distortions present in our model, the welfare of the representative consumer is adversely
a®ected by variability in consumption and the dispersion of hours worked between
households (similarly to Levin, et al. (2005)).
The minimization of the loss function is subject to the DSGE model described
before. The optimization results in a set of ¯rst order conditions, which combined with
the model equations yields a system of di®erence equations that can be solved with
several alternative algorithms.
On the other hand, we close the model with alternative simple rules and compare
the results when a bubble shock occurs. The ¯rst policy rule that we examine is the
°exible price rule eq.(28), where the central bank responds only to in°ation and output
gap (de¯ned as deviations from the °exible price equilibrium). The second policy rule







































The third and fourth rules are similar to simple the rule eq.(28) and eq.(30), but
instead of using deviations of output and asset prices from the °exible price equilibrium

































































Finally, we use two simple rules where output and asset prices gap are de¯ned as
deviations from steady-state values (ss).
153.1 Results for Boom-Bust
The results in Figure 2-4 show the dynamic response or our model to a ²t shock that
occurs in period 1, followed by et = ¡²t+p for p = 5. Thus, there is a signal that
technology will improve in the future but in the end turns out to be false. A positive
signal arriving in t ¡ p indicates households that the economy is likely to be more
productive p periods ahead. Anticipating this, they try to bring to the present the future
value of more production. They increase consumption and investment, in preparation
for the future expected increase in productivity. To ¯nance these activities, households
increase their demand for credit and assets. Capital price rises because of the expected
need for new capital in the future. This constitutes the boom stage of the cycle, based
solely on expectations. But p periods ahead, when productivity is supposed to change, a
surprise shock ²t may occur. If for instance, ²t = ¡et¡p, then productivity stays still and
the expected productivity change was not realized. This may happen for instance, if a
new technology resulted less e±cient than expected, or if a production policy failed after
generating good signals. Then households face the consequences of higher consumption
and investment ¯nanced through credit, without real support. The economy enters
a recession: consumption, investment, asset prices and general economic activity fall.
The boom has been burst.
We compare the dynamic properties of of output, consumption, investment, asset
prices, nominal interest rate, real wages, deposits, credit and in°ation in the Ramsey
equilibrium with the behavior of these variables when we close the model with alter-
native simple policy rules. Figure 2 shows the dynamic response of these variables for
the Ramsey equilibrium and for the model closed with the simple rule that reacts to
output and in°ation growth rate and the rule that besides reacts to asset prices growth
rate, with ½pk = 0:5. With a monetary authority that follows a simple rule, a minor
°uctuation is transformed into a substantial boom-bust cycle. This happens ¯rst be-
cause the real wage rises during the boom in the Ramsey equilibrium so an e±cient
way to achieve a higher real wage is to let in°ation drop. But, the monetary authority
who follows the in°ation-targeting strategy is reluctant to allow this to happen. Such
a monetary authority responds to in°ation weakness by shifting to a looser monetary
policy stance and second when the productivity shock is not realized the central bank
does not react fast enough relative to the optimal policy causing higher volatility.
Letting a reaction from central bank to asset prices gap does not improve very much
the dynamics of the variables, but as we will see later when we compare the rules in
16terms of central bank losses there exist an important di®erence.
Figure 3 plots the results of the policy rule that takes into account output and
asset prices deviations from the °exible economy. The boom-bust is smoother in this
case because the boom is shorter than in the case of the °exible prices rules shown in
Figure 2. The worse scenario occurs in the case were the monetary authority uses an
instrument rule that reacts to deviations of output and asset prices from steady state
values, Figure 4. In this case, the dynamic of the series is much more volatile. In
addition, when the productivity shock turns out to be false, the monetary authority
reacts too slowly relative to the °exible price rule. In terms of these responses this is
the less desirable type of rule. The most suited policy rule, that is closer to the optimal
policy, is the simple rule that reacts to output gap and asset prices gap using deviations
from the °exible prices economy.
Something worth noting is that if the monetary policy is more aggressive (½¼ = 2:25)
than accommodative (½¼ = 1:25) in terms of targeting in°ation in the rule that uses
deviations from the °exible equilibrium economy, the volatility of output, and in°ation
is reduced as can be seen in Figure 5. Therefore, we compute the losses for the di®erent
types of rules for both cases, the accommodative and the aggressive monetary policy.
Table 1 below shows the results for the three alternative criteria of welfare for the
alternative simple rules under accommodative and aggressive policy rules. The optimal
policy using deviations from the °exible prices in the loss function is the one that
delivers the lower losses.
As can be seen, the lower losses are obtained with the °exible price rules with an
aggressive monetary policy. Rules that perform the worst are those where the monetary
authority responds to deviations of output and asset prices from steady-state values.
When the central bank follows a policy rule, an aggressive stance against in°ation
seems to control better the e®ects of the bubble, in terms of central bank losses. This
happens because an aggressive stance allows a lower variability of in°ation. A tighter
control of prices does not allow the bubble to build up, so the relevant gap of asset prices
is lower in the aggressive case. This in turn re°ects in a slower growth of investment
and output when the bubble is building up and generates a deeper fall of the relevant
gap of these aggregates when the bubble bursts.
If the central bank does not follow an optimal policy, for the three objective func-
tions the best results are achieved when the bank follows a rule that takes into account
deviations of output and asset prices with respect to their hypothetical paths in an econ-
17omy with °exible prices. Since the expectational shock is real by nature, the economy
with °exible prices has similar e®ects: an increase in gross production, consumption,
investment and domestic and foreign debt. The central bank that takes into account
that the °exible-price real variables are deviated as well will try harder to control prices
and to make real variables behave as in the °exible-price economy. Therefore it allows a
lower variability of prices and allows a faster fall of consumption, investment and credit
when the productivity shock is not realized. This fast adjustment is re°ected in less
variability of real GDP and generates a smaller loss.
We must note that the dynamics of the economy do not change by much if the
central bank takes or not into account the asset prices in the policy rule. The only
case in which targeting the price of asset decreases the loss of the central bank for
the unrealized productivity shock is when the policy rule looks at the °exible-prices
economy. In this case the relative improvement from including asset prices is of 32
percent when the loss function uses °exible equilibrium variables. For all the remaining
rules, targeting the asset prices do not decreases the loss. Just as before, if the central
bank targets deviations of asset prices, then it will not allow for a fast adjustment. In
the case of the °exible-prices economy the asset prices fall sharply, and the rule that
follows this information will do a fast adjustment.
In conclusion, to minimize the loss of the central bank, a fast adjustment of the
economy is needed when it is obvious that the productivity shock really did not happen.
4 Conclusions
We calibrated a DSGE model for the Colombian economy that incorporates features
such as sticky prices and wages, a banking sector and a ¯nancial fragility describing
balance sheet e®ects. We use the model to compute the optimal policy response of
the economy under an expectations shock of improvement in technology that turns out
to be false. The benchmark optimal-Ramsey equilibrium is used to compare simple
policy rules that monetary authorities might use in the implementation of monetary
policy. We ¯nd out that the simple policy rule that reacts to deviations of output
from potential output de¯ned as the hypothetical output level that would exist if the
economy would have had °exible prices, is the one that delivers the lower central bank
losses. This, because a fast adjustment of the economy is needed when it is obvious
that the productivity shock did not happen. Adding asset prices gaps to the policy
18rule do not improve much the dynamics of the economy unless the central bank is able
to identify asset prices misalignments. Finally, an aggressive monetary policy in terms
of ¯ghting in°ation rate reduces central bank losses given that output and in°ation
variability are reduced.
19Table 1: Welfare comparison for unrealized productivity shock (multiplied by 105)
Model Optimal Steady State Optimal Flexible Gaps Optimal utility approx
Losses Losses Value of Welfare
Optimal 3.6919 0.054096 0.12467
Rule °ex. gap Accomodative 2.2808 1.4490 -2.1897
Aggresive 1.1700 0.7405 -0.9463
Rule °ex. gap + asset prices Accomodative 1.6130 0.9483 -1.4539
Aggresive 0.9025 0.5501 -0.6513
Rule growth Accomodative 7.4613 5.8217 -8.0248
Aggresive 3.1063 2.3085 -3.0443
Rule growth + asset prices Accomodative 8.2769 6.5008 -8.9499
Aggresive 4.1039 3.0917 -4.1956
Rule steady state Accomodative 26.828 23.463 -27.963
Aggresive 6.8551 5.5609 -6.9933
Rule s.s. + asset prices Accomodative 27.850 24.424 -27.238
Aggresive 8.6478 7.1005 -8.7345
2
0References
Arias, A. F. (2000). The Colombian Banking Crisis: Macroeconomic Consequences And
What To Expect. Borradores de Econom¶ ³a 157, Banco de la Rep¶ ublica de Colombia.
Bernanke, B. M. Gertler (1999). Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility. Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, v.84, 4, 17-52.
Arango, J. P., O. Gracia, G. Hern¶ andez, and J. M. Ram¶ ³rez (1998). Reformas comer-
ciales, m¶ argenes de bene¯cio y productividad en la industria colombiana. Archivos
de Econom¶ ³a 82, Departamento Nacional de Planeaci¶ on.
Bonaldi. P, A. Gonzalez, J.D. Prada, D. Rodriguez, L. Rojas (2009). M¶ etodo Num¶ erico
para la calibraci¶ on de un Modelo DSGE. Borradores de Economia 548, Banco de la
Republica de Colombia.
Borio, C., William, E. and Filardo, A., 2003. A Tale of Two Perspectives: Old or New
Challenges for Monetary Policy?, BIS Working Paper, 127.
Calvo, G. A., 1983. Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework, Journal of
Monetary Economics, 12, 383-398.
Dixit, A. K. and J. Stiglitz, 1977. Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product
Diversity. American Economic Review, 67, 297- 308.
Christiano, L. C. Ilut, R. Motto and M. Rostagno 2008. Monetary Policy and Stock
Market Boom-bust Cycles. European Central Bank, Working Paper, 955.
Erceg, C. D. Henderson and A. Levin, 2000. Optimal Monetary Policy With Staggered
Wage and Price Contracts, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 46(2), 281-313.
Edwards, S., and C. Vegh (1997). Banks and macroeconomic disturbances under pre-
determined exchange rate. Journal of Monetary Economics, 40, 239-278.
Gerali, A. and F. Lippi, 2002. Optimal Control and Filtering in Linear Forward-Looking
Economies: A Toolkit. Mimeo, Bank of Italy.
Gerali, A. S. Neri, L. Sessa and F. Signoretti, 2008. Credit and Banking in a DSGE
Model. Mimeo, Bank of Italy.
21Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and G. Hu®man, 1988. Investment, Capacity Utilization,
and the Real Bussiness Cycle. American Economic Review, vol 78, 402-417.
Levin, A. T. and D. Lopez-Salido (2004). Optimal monetary policy with endogenous
capital accumulation. manuscript.
Levin, A., A. Onatski, J. Williams and N. Williams, 2005. Monetary Policy Under Un-
certainty in Micro-Founded Macroeconometric Models. NBER Working Paper 11523
L¶ opez, M., J.D. Prada and N. Rodr¶ ³guez, 2008. Financial Accelerator Mechanism in
a Small Open Economy. Borradores de Economia 525, Banco de la Rep¶ ublica de
Colombia.
Mahadeva, L., and J. C. Parra (2008). Testing a DSGE model and its partner database.
Borradores de Economia 479, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
Prada, J.D. (2008). Financial Intermediation and Monetary Policy in a Small Open
Economy. Banco de la Rep¶ ublica, Borrador 531.
Prada, J.D. and L.E. Rojas(2009). La elasticidad de Frish y la transmisi¶ on de la pol¶ ³tica
monetaria en Colombia. Borradores de Economia 555, Banco de la Republica de
Colombia.
Schmitt-Groh¶ e, S., and M. Uribe (2003). Closing small open economy models. Journal
of International Economics, 61(1), 163-185.
SÄ oderlind, P. (1999) Solution and Estimation of RE Macromodels with Optimal Policy.
European Economic Review, 43, 813-823.
Svensson, L. (2007). Optimization under Commitment and Discretion, the Recursive
Saddlepoint Method, and Targeting Rules and Instrument Rules: Lecture notes.
Svensson, L., A. Malin, S. Las¶ een and J. Lind¶ e (2008). Optimal Monetary Policy in an
Operational Medium-Sized DSGE Model. Manuscript.
Woodford, M. (2001). In°ation stabilization and welfare. National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper, No. 8071.
22Figure 1: Asset prices and economic activity
23Figure 2: Expectation of Technology Shock in period 5 Not Realized: Optimal Vs
Simple with Growth rates
24Figure 3: Expectation of Technology Shock in period 5 Not Realized: Optimal Vs
Simple with deviations from Flexible Equilibrium
25Figure 4: Expectation of Technology Shock in period 5 Not Realized: Optimal Vs
Simple with deviations from Steady State
26Figure 5: Expectation of Technology Shock in period 5 Not Realized: Taylor Accom-
modative vs Aggressive
27